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War Powers 
UNDECLARED WAR: TWILIGHT ZONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
POWER By Edward Keynes. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylva-
nia State University Press, 1982. Pp. ix, 236. $17.95. 
Reviewed by W. Taylor Reveley, III* 
Interpreting the constitutional separation of the congressional war 
powers from the presidential office of commander in chief is a 
difficult art that requires the skills of a historian, constitutional 
lawyer, political scientist, social psychologist, and the Oracle of 
Apollo at Delphi. (P. 31) 
Dr. Keynes captures the essence nicely. For nearly two centuries the war 
powers have bedeviled a host of Presidents, congressmen, and those few 
judges willing to deal with them in court. The constitutional division of the 
war powers between the executive and legislative branches remains unclear 
today. Many hold beliefs nurtured by events since 1789-those of the Cold 
War in particular-that the Constitution vests in the President a broad prerog-
ative over American war and peace. For many others, like Keynes, the Indo-
china conflict reawakened belief in a dominant congressional role, well rooted 
in the constitutional text and in the debates of its Framers and Ratifiers. As a 
result, interested Americans have disagreed vigorously in recent years about 
the constitutionality of various presidential and congressional approaches to 
the use of force. 
Since government began under the Constitution, struggles over the war 
powers have erupted constantly between the President and Congress. By 1815 
the United States had fought an array of Indians (in effect, foreign enemies); 
the two greatest powers of the day, France and Britain; and the Barbary , 
States. In addition, the Republic had skirted hostilities with Spain while 
pressing to relieve her of Florida. Thus, the respective constitutional preroga-
tives of the President and Congress over war and peace were of great concern 
to Americans while Washington, John Adams, and Madison held office. And 
there have been few administrations in which the nature of these prerogatives 
has not been heatedly debated. 
Nonetheless, the search for a satisfactory theory of the war powers has 
been more intense and fruitful ~ince the United States entered the Indochina 
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conflict than at any prior time.1 Given the experience of the past generation 
with American involvement abroad and prior experience with isolation and 
nonintervention, we do seem closer now than ever before to a mature under-
standing of how to divide authority between the President and Congress over 
war and peace. Keynes's book joins this quest.2 
l. THE ELEMENTS OF A SATISFACTORY THEORY OF THE WAR POWERS 
A satisfactory theory of the war powers must successfully unite (1) the 
text of the Constitution's war-power provisions, (2) the purposes of those who 
wrote and ratified the text in 1787-1788, (3) the evolving beliefs of Americans 
since 1789 about what the Constitution requires, and (4) the various alloca-
tions of control over the war powers that have existed in fact between the 
President and Congress during the past two centuries; Text and purpose are 
reasonably straightforward guides for constitutional interpretation. The 
evolving beliefs about the requirements of the Constitution and actual alloca-
tions of power are more convoluted; together they make up what is generally 
termed "practice," or "usage."3 Practice has been shaped not only by the 
1. Keynes characterized Vietnam as the first modern undeclared conflict to test the Presi-
dent's warmaking powers. He suggests that the President's use of troops in the Korean War was 
pursuant to the United Nations Charter, which has the force of law in the United States. 
Furthermore, notes Keynes, World War 11 did not technically terminate until Aprill952 so that 
the initial deployment of troops was valid under war-time statutes (p. Ill). 
While Indochina far more than Korea did provide an occasion for constitutional testing, 
Keynes's explanation for this phenomenon is not compelling. Given the Tonkin Gulf Resolution 
of 1964, a strong case can be made that American involvement in Indochina, unlike Korea, was 
expressly authorized by Congress until the resolution's repeal in 1971. The reason that Indochina 
but not Korea provoked such constitutional testing, accordingly, is not immediately obvious. 
Perhaps the main reason lies in the respective lengths of the two conflicts. Had the Indochina War 
ended as quickly as the Korean War (say, by 1968), it too would not have been the object of such 
constitutional uproar. Further, unlike Korea, Indochina arose when, as a result of the civil rights 
movement, the country had become accustomed to constitutional confrontations. That movement 
rose in force only after Korea ended and peaked just as Indochina was getting well underway, 
releasing much of its energy to matters of war and peace. 
2. The Indochina conflict unleashed a flood of opinion, scholarship and action on the war 
powers-in law reviews, books, and the media; in proposed and actual legislation of many sorts, 
as well as voluminous congressional hearings; in publications of the executive branch; in the 
verbal positions taken by Presidents and Congressmen on pertinent issues; and, in judicial 
decisions. Among the ensuing books were T. Eagleton, War and Presidential Power: A Chronicle 
of Congressional Surrender (1974); L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (1972); J. 
Javits, Who Makes War: The President Versus Congress (1973); W. Reveley, War Powers of the 
President and Congress: Who Holds the Arrows and Olive Branch? (1981); A. Schlesinger, Jr., 
The Imperial Presidency (1973); A. Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power: The 
Origins (1976); L. Velvel, Undeclared War and Civil Disobedience: The American System in 
Crisis (1970). The books unleashed by Indochina continue to emerge. See, e.g., J. Sullivan, The 
War Powers Resolution: A Special Study of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (1982); A. Thomas 
& A. Thomas, Jr., The War-Making Powers of the President (1982). 
3. Constitutional fundamentalists, of course, say that practice has no legitimate role in 
constitutional interpretation. It is certainly true that the actual language of the Constitution and, 
to a lesser extent, the evidence of the Framers' and Ratifiers' purposes for adopting particular 
provisions, are the primary determinants of what the Constitution means. The actual language of 
the document has unique standing. Its words alone have been formally drafted and ratified as 
constitutional law-a status not shared by the Framers' and Ratifiers' comments or by any aspect 
of subsequent practice, Supreme Court decisions included. It follows that when the war-power 
provisions of the document do explicitly allocate control between the two branches, the allocation 
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constitutional text and debates, but also by three additional factors: the 
hazard, pace, and complexity of America's international relations at any 
particular time; the respective institutional capabilities of the President and 
Congress to cope with these changing relations; and the shifting balance of 
political strength between the two branches. _ 
All of these factors have contributed to the allocation of the war powers 
between the President and Congress. More important, they will all continue to 
contribute, barring a radical change in American habits. This does not doom 
us to wander amid constitutional confusion, obtaining firm direction only 
from the prevailing political winds. It does suggest that successful constitu-
tional answers must take into account all of the factors: the historical and 
political, as well as the purely legal. 
To what extent does Undeclared War further the quest for a satisfactory 
theory of the war powers? Keynes discusses only in passing the text of many of 
the Constitution's war-power provisions and the implications that may be 
drawn from them. He sketches more fully the purposes of the Framers-if not 
the Ratifiers-by usefully setting out the "philosophical milieu" that shaped 
the conclusions of the Framers in 1787. The focus of Keynes's book, however, 
is on one aspect of post-1789 practice: the role of the courts in defining-or 
declining to define-the respective war powers of the President and Congress. 
Keynes's treatment of pertinent judicial decisions, especially those spawned by 
the Indochina conflict, is among the most complete now available. 
The nonjudicial aspects of war-power practice, including the history of 
relations between Congress and the Executive Branch, are largely ignored in 
Undeclared War. Their disregard is serious because, as Keynes laments, 
judges have been loathe to take cases involving the war powers. Thus, these 
powers have largely been shaped over the past two centuries by the beliefs and 
must be honored. Accordingly, none doubt that Congress must vote to declare war if America is 
to declare it. But in most cases, the demands of the Constitution must be interpreted from sources 
other than the words themselves. We must look beyond the text to decide, for example, which if 
any hostilities require a declaration of war. 
Evidence of the Framers' and Ratifiers' purposes has the first claim to shape whatever 
meaning is given to uncertainties in the Constitution's provisions. But while the deliberations of 
1787-1788 are entitled to deference, they should not mesmerize us. As the Framers of the 
Constitution were aware, much of their debate reflected problems peculiar to America at that 
time. See infra notes 12-13. They and others of their generation tend to interpret the Constitution 
by reading its text in light of experience and the document's underlying principles rather than in 
terms of the minutiae of their deliberations. 
Moreover, the constitutional text has successfully been interpreted in ways contrary to the 
apparent intentions of its Framers and Ratifiers, even during its early years. For example, a 
strikingly greater diplomatic role for the Senate was assumed in the 1787-1790 conventions than 
actually developed during the first generation under the Constitution. It is inescapable that beliefs 
about what the Constitution's war-power provisions require, as well as the nature of actual 
allocations of control, have evolved over the past two centuries. It is not true that their evolution 
has simply been a descent into unconstitutionality. Rather, since 1789 the country has struggled to 
give concrete meaning to the Constitution's abstract terms, mark the bounds of its competing 
grants of authority, and fill in its gaps. Along the way we have frequently replaced old expecta-
tions about the law and old divisions of raw power with new understandings and arrangements 
more responsive to the changing circumstances of the country. In short, practice since 1789 does 
have a role in constitutional interpretation. See generally W. Reveley, supra note 2, at 170-75. 
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actions of Presidents, members of Congress, Secretaries of State and War (or 
Defense), other bureaucrats, military and diplomatic officers, and commenta-
tors. 
The most serious consequence of Keynes's limited, judicial focus is his 
failure to discuss the only statute purporting to allocate the war powers 
between the President and Congress: the War Powers Resolution of 1973.4 
The Resolution resulted from a decade of constitutional dispute between the 
legislative and executive branches, spurred by an explosion in war-power 
debate and scholarship. As noted below, the Resolution will very likely prove 
to be the most significant single influence on the development of the war 
powers since the adoption of the Constitution itself. 
II. KEYNEs's ARGUMENT 
There are three basic elements to Keynes's argument in Undeclared War. 
First, he suggests that, while the text of the Constitution and its Framers' 
purposes require prior congressional approval for any offensive use of Ameri-
can arms, leaving defensive uses to the President's discretion, in modern times 
the offensive/defensive dichotomy no longer provides a realistic basis for 
dividing the war powers between the President and Congress. Second, to the 
extent courts have been willing to do anything at all about the growing 
executive hegemony over the war powers, judges have usually made the 
situation worse by creating a "twilight zone of concurrent power" (p. 166).5 
In cases falling within this zone, courts have read imprecise congressional 
acts-often passed in the wake of executive faits accomplis-as having ap-
proved offensive as well as defensive use of force by the President. Third, 
while courts may be expected to play a limited role in restraining offensive use 
of force by Presidents-perhaps a greater role after Indochina than before-it 
remains for Congress to limit executive war-making by insisting on a prior 
consensus between the executive and the legislative branches about American 
use of force abroad. Each of these elements bears scrutiny. 
A. The Offensive/Defensive Dichotomy 
As to the first element, Keynes concludes that the Framers gave the 
commander-in-chief power to the President on the assumption that the Presi-
dent and Congress will perform two separate functions with regard to military 
activities. Congress can change the nation's condition from peace to war. The 
President, on the other hand, can repel sudden attacks-be they on U.S. 
territory or on armed forces abroad-in his capacity as civilian commander in 
chief. The President may also use the armed forces to protect the lives and 
property of United States citizens abroad (p. 34). Keynes suggests that by 
4. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
5. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) ("there is a zone of twilight in which [the President! and Congress may have 
concurrent authority"). 
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giving "defensive" powers to the President, it was intended that his authority 
in this domain be exclusive. "While Congress has broad power to curb 
presidential warmaking, the legislature cannot constitutionally limit the Presi-
dent's defensive power" (p. 165). 
In all likelihood, however, Keynes has overstated the discretion that the 
Framers and Ratifiers intended for the President. The "fundamental distinc-
tion between offensive and defensive war and hostilities" (p. 34), on which 
Keynes relies is largely a construct of post-1789 practice, not of the original 
understanding. Far more than the Framers and Ratifiers, it is post-1789 usage 
that suggests the President "has the exclusive constitutional authority to 
defend U.S. citizens, territory, troops, and property against sudden attack or 
when the threat of attack is imminent" (p. 88). Neither the 1787-1788 debates 
nor the text of the Constitution itself reveals such sweeping executive preroga-
tive. 
The debates do indicate that the Framers envisaged the use of armed 
force without a formal declaration of war, but not, unless the nation were 
suddenly attacked, without prior authorization by majority vote of the House 
and Senate. The Framers and Ratifiers understood the distinction between 
limited use of armed force in discrete contexts and unrestricted general hostili-
ties, and intended to provide for both contingencies in the Constitution. They 
were aware that most eighteenth-century conflicts had not been formally 
declared and that political theorists distinguished between general and limited 
conflict, with marque and reprisal explicitly recognized as a means of waging 
the latter. Defensive or retaliatory uses of force, the sorts expected for Amer-
ica in 1787-1788, tended in that era to be limited, undeclared engagements. In 
addition, the word "declare" was loosely employed by the Framers in ways 
equating it with "begin" or "authorize." Use of the term suggests that the 
Framers expected a more active role for Congress than Keynes recognizes. The 
Framers' grant of authority to Congress to declare war and issue letters of 
marque and reprisal almost certainly was intended to convey control over all 
involvement of American forces in combat whether for defensive or offensive 
purposes, except in response to sudden attack. 6 
Even then, the text of the Constitution suggests that the Framers expected 
the states to bear the major burden of defense against sudden attack until 
Congress could act.7 The only evidence of equivalent authority for the Presi-
dent must be gleaned from a brief, confused Philadelphia debate-less than 
two pages in Madison's notes-which ended with the substitution of "de-
clare" for "make" in the clause delineating Congress's war power.8 The 
discussion meandered and the nature of crucial votes remains obscure; but it is 
6. See generally W. Reveley, supra note 2, at 51-ll5. 
7. Although the states may engage "without the Consent of Congress ... in War •.. [if] 
actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay," U.S. Canst. art. I, § 10, 
cl.3, there is no equivalent constitutional provision authorizing presidential response to either 
ongoing or imminent attack. 
8. See 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 318 (M. Farrand ed. 19ll); see also 
W. Reveley, supra note 2, at 64, 81-85, 101-02. 
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not likely that the substitution signaled much gain in executive prerogative in 
the minds of the Framers. George Mason voted for the substitution despite his 
phobia about presidential power, and the change later was ratified without 
objection by any of the most virulent foes of executive power. 
The substitution may have been designed simply to prevent Congress 
from asserting control over the conduct, as well as the initiation, of conflict. 
Even if, as seems more probable, the change was intended to authorize 
emergency military action by the President, no mention was made of any 
power on his part to defend the nation against imminent as opposed to 
ongoing attack, much less of power to defend anything abroad-such as U.S. 
citizens and property in other countries. Thus, in the light most favorable to 
presidential prerogative, the Framers' substitution of "declare" for "make" 
permits executive response to ongoing physical attack on American territory 
and may also allow preemptive strikes by the President against impending 
attack, until Congress can decide whether to pursue the hostilities. 
The commander-in-chief clause, in turn, received little attention from the 
Framers and Ratifiers.9 It was viewed as a modest grant of authority. Hamil-
ton's limited "first general and admiral" interpretation reflected the consen-
sus.10 During hostilities the President would set strategy and tactics, and his 
authority would inevitably grow during a military crisis. But he would not 
commit America to hostilities except by signing authorizing legislation, and he 
would not make peace except as a participant with the Senate in the treaty 
process. Those who fought the commander-in-chief clause did so out of fear 
that the President would turn the army to treason at home. The Federalists 
responded by citing the need for a single commander during war (a lesson 
learned from the Revolution) and the danger of placing it in an ambitious 
general rather than a civil officer with a fixed tenure. They said that only the 
rare President would personally command the troops, and that there would be 
no armies, navies, or militia for him to lead unless Congress so provided. No 
one suggested that the President would have an unlimited prerogative to use 
foree so long as it was used for defensive ends. The declare-war and com-
mander-in-chief clauses passed with little debate because they left Congress 
with authority over whether the American military would be used. Other than 
the President's participation in legislating military policy, his only role was to 
execute it. 
Having found an offensive/defensive dichotomy in the original under-
standing, Keynes then argues that the twentieth century has undone it. 
Changes in the technology of warfare, he notes, have eliminated any coherent 
distinction between the "offensive" and "defensive" use of military force. He 
cites as examples the deployment of U.S. intermediate range missiles in Tur-
key and the stationing of Soviet combat troops in Cuba. Should these be 
considered offensive or defensive measures? For that matter, he asks, is a 
preemptive nuclear first strike a defensive or an offensive act (p. 3)? 11 
9. See W. Reveley, supra note 2, at 64-65, 75, 77, 80, 82-84, 88-90, 97, 100, 102-06. 
10. The Federalist No. 69, at 418 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
11. See also pp. 40, 88-89. 
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But for reasons already noted, the distinction between offensive and 
defensive uses of force did not figure heavily in how the Framers and Ratifiers 
anticipated the war powers would be divided between Congress and the Presi-
dent. The source of the constitutional tension between the executive and 
legislative branches over the war powers lies not in the dawn of a new era, as 
Keynes maintains. Rather, the difficulty in developing a satisfactory theory of 
the war powers arose when the Framers' and Ratifiers' basic expectation-
that there would be prior congressional approval of all American use of force 
except under the very limited circumstances of sudden attack-proved to be 
unrealistic almost from the moment government began under the Constitu-
tion.12 President Washington with the Indians, Jefferson with the Barbary 
States, Madison and Monroe as they sought to take Florida from Spain, Polk 
in pursuing manifest destiny at Mexico's expense, and Lincoln blockading and 
raising troops against the South-in fact almost all Presidents from 1789 on-
have used force offensively, as well as defensively, without prior congressional 
approval. 
Nor was the line between defensive and offensive action much more easily 
drawn in the nineteenth century than today. In each of the instances just 
mentioned, Americans disagreed about where to mark the boundary, just as 
they now differ over how to categorize "deployment of U.S. intermediate-
range missiles in Turkey or the stationing of Soviet combat troops in Cuba" 
(p. 3).13 
12. The Framers' unrealistic view of prior approval fits within a larger context of related but 
equally ephemeral views: that peace and noninvolvement with the rest of the world would be 
America's customary condition; that the hazard, pace, and complexity of international affairs 
would remain as they were in 1787-1788, along with the country's virtually nonexistent capacity 
and need to work its will abroad; that treaties would prove to be the heart of American foreign 
relations; that the Senate could keep step with the President in diplomacy; that the regular 
military would not achieve its present size and stand during peace, little restrained by the need for 
Congress to raise and support it; and that the loyalty of naturalized citizens, the navigation of the 
Mississippi, and other compelling issues of the late eighteenth century would be indicative of the 
country's enduring security concerns. 
13. But while the war powers do not raise new constitutional issues today, they do present 
issues of wholly new dimensions that-because of the changes in the international system and the 
conduct of warfare to which Keynes refers-have unprecedented gravity. 
During the first generation under the Constitution, the country suffered the trials of a small, 
weak nation caught up, if at a distance, in the wars of the prevailing superpowers. The country, 
nonetheless, was shielded by geography, the limited military technology of its potential foes, the 
inability of America to intervene abroad, and its slight economic interdependence with other 
nations. During most of the nineteenth century, America was even further sheltered by the rise of 
a European balance of power for which it had no direct responsibility. 
During the last three decades, the circumstances have changed. The purely physical ability of 
postwar America to commit its military abroad in large or small numbers, swiftly or slowly, for 
days or years, vastly exceeds the country's capacity before 1941. America's willingness to inter-
vene abroad also stands in radical contrast to a previous tradition of nouinvolvement except to 
trade, defend American citizens and property abroad, expand our boundaries, and police the 
Caribbean. Coupled with this new capacity and will to use force abroad are consequences of 
intervention that defy prediction and risk catastrophe more than ever before. Even the time when 
weak states could be roughly handled with little risk of violating international law and political 
sensibilities has passed. The American military can no longer punish with relative impunity 
"backward" peoples who have attacked our citizens and property, or pursue criminals across the 
borders of weak states, or occupy and administer Caribbean countries. See W. Reveley, supra 
note 2, at 12-13, 165-66, 177, 184-85, 265, 348 n.66. 
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B. Judicial Failure to Police the War Powers 
The second major theme of Keynes's argument is that the judiciary's 
treatment of the war powers has served only to confuse and distort the basic 
issues. Especially since the Civil War, according to Keynes, the judiciary has 
allowed Congress and the President to fuse their constitutionally distinct 
authority into a single war power. That power, in turn, has been exercised by 
the commander in chief with few limitations. This situation has evolved under 
a theory of "joint participation," developed by judges and commentators, 
which, Keynes says, unjustifiably allows Congress to transfer power to initiate 
military hostilities to the President.14 
Keynes is correct that the courts have done a poor job of policing the war 
powers. Usually they have declined to take the job at all. When judges have 
acted, often they have wrung congressional approval for presidential initia-
tives out of legislative activity, or inactivity, that fell far short of express 
authorization of American use of force (pp. 101-09, 120-60).15 
Nonetheless, the result does not deserve Keynes's grim judgment that 
"the judiciary has encouraged the legislature and the executive to fuse their 
separate powers of war and defense into a national war power whose only 
standard is the extraconstitutional one of success on the battlefield" (p. 167). 
First, the judiciary has had relatively little to do with the process. Second, 
those people and institutions that have been heavily involved in it have not 
done nearly the bad job that Keynes suggests. The "practice of presidential 
military fait accompli" (p. 167) did not begin, as Keynes argues, with the Civil 
War (although no prior or subsequent President has matched Lincoln's unilat-
eral acts in 1861).16 Starting with George Washington, Presidents began using 
the military on their own initiative, some more than others and with varying 
degrees of congressional ratification.17 As stated previously, the Framers' and 
Ratifiers' expectation that Congress would authorize in advance all use of 
force by this country, except in response to sudden attack, proved unrealistic 
from the outset. 
Thus, the country has been working since 1789 toward a satisfactory 
theory of the war powers. The process has not simply involved Congress, the 
courts, and the public supine before rising presidential prerogative over Amer-
ican war and peace.18 The legislators have been the driving influence behind 
certain decisions to fight. Some Presidents have sought prior congressional 
approval, been denied it, and foresworn armed action.19 On other occasions 
executives or their subordinates have begun a use of force only to end it when 
14. "Congress cannot prospectively or retroactively authorize the President to choose the 
enemy, the time and the place of military hostilities" (p. 167). 
15. See also W. Reveley, supra note 1, at 11, 140, 148-49, 212-15, 345-46 nn.33-34. 
16. 1n the early months of his Presidency, Lincoln increased the size of the Army and the 
Navy, called out the militia, summoned volunteers, paid money from the Treasury to private 
parties to further the war effort, and blockaded confederate ports-all while Congress was out of 
session. When Congress finally met, it ratified the President's actions. Id. at 125-26. 
17. See id. at 121-30, 135-61. 
18. See id. at 121-31. 
19. ld. at 121. 
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Congress refused to vote ratification or vital implementing tools.20 On yet 
other occasions Presidents have been permitted to go forward subject to 
congressional constraints, for instance, as to geography or type of force. 21 
Presidents, too, have at times declined even to attempt military acton in the 
face of anticipated congressional opposition. 22 Far more often, of course, 
majorities in the Senate and House have affirmatively agreed with the Presi-
dent on how force should be used; sometimes the resulting congressional 
acceptance of executive policy has been the product of genuine interchange 
between the two branches, and sometimes Congress has acquiesced in presi-
dential initiatives.23 Then, too, some presidential actions, if ever blessed by 
Congress, were blessed because the circumstances left no other acceptable 
option.24 
Various constitutional standards can be drawn from the interplay that 
has occurred since 1789. The precise nature of these standards-their defini-
tion of a satisfactory theory of the war powers-remains a matter of disagree-
ment among reasonable people. But the state of the art has advanced signifi-
cantly in recent years, and there is reason to believe that the outline of an 
emerging constitutional consensus was drawn in the War Powers Resolution 
of 197325 despite presidential objection to certain of its terms. That incipient 
consensus, stated in broad terms that do not necessarily mirror those of the 
Resolution, (1) leaves to the President the discretion to begin military action 
that he thinks in the national interest, so long as he promptly reports the use 
of force to Congress, but thereafter (2) requires express congressional authori-
zation to continue the military action beyond a few months, and (3) urges the 
President at all times to consult closely with Congress on matters of war and 
peace. 26 Element (1) takes most of its constitutional justification from practice 
since 1789, while elements (2) and (3) are more directly drawn from the actual 
language of the Constitution and the expectations of its Framers and Ratifi-
ers. 
C. Proposed Congressional Role 
Against this background comes the last of Keynes's central themes. He 
concludes that since the judiciary has proved to be particularly tolerant of the 
20. Id. at 122. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 122-23. 
23. Id. at 124. 
24. See supra note 16. 
25. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
26. Arguably, there is a fourth element as well: an understanding that majorities in the 
Senate and House, via a concurrent resolution, may vote limits on, or an end to, a presidential 
military initiative at any time during its conduct. The legal force of such a "legislative veto" is 
doubtful, however, after the Supreme Court's holdings that such vetoes in other contexts are 
unconstitutional. See INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983); Process Gas Consumers Group v. 
Consumers Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (mem}, aff'g Consumer Energy Council 
of America v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States Senate v. FTC, 103 S. Ct. 3556 
(1983) (mem}, aff'g Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
Dissenting in Chadha, Justice White warned: "Today the Court not only invalidates § 244(c)(2) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, but also sounds the death knell for nearly 200 other 
statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a 'legislative veto.'" 103 S. Ct. at 2792. 
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exercise of executive power, opponents of presidential warmaking must look 
to Congress for relief (p. 175). He suggests, however, that "the concept of an 
indivisible national war power permits the President to suspend the separation 
of powers as long as Congress concurs in his decisions" (p. 169). Yet if 
Congress loses confidence in the President's military policy, Keynes fears that 
it will have to "mobilize a two-thirds majority to override the commander in 
chief's actions" (id.). Failing that, Congress's only other remedy is impeach-
ment and removal (p. 170). 
Keynes is concerned that Congress may not be equal to the task. His 
concern, however, largely ignores the War Powers Resolution of 1973. He 
mentions it only twice in the last pages of his book.27 Yet the act appears to be 
directly on point. In unprecedented fashion, it sets out procedures for how the 
President and legislators are to go about deciding whether to use force, and it 
constitutes the best chance Congress has had since 1789 for guaranteed oppor-
tunities to participate in deciding whether America uses force if the combat 
lasts more than forty-eight hours. Thus, though largely overlooked by Keynes, 
the Resolution accomplishes many of the goals he endorses. It does permit 
"opponents of presidential warmaking" to focus realistically "on Congress 
rather than the Federal courts" (p. 175). While the act does not deny the 
President quick, surgical applications of armed force, it makes clear, as 
Keynes strongly urges, that "explicit legislative authorization" is required for 
any long-term commitment of American forces to hostilities, thus assuring 
that "the nation [wiii] not wage a long, protracted, undeclared war without 
fundamental prior agreement between Congress and the President" (p. 175). 
It also avoids the possibility that Congress must mobilize a two-thirds major-
ity to override the commander in chief's actions (p. 169). Under the Resolu-
tion, an executive initiative ends (a) within sixty to ninety days unless a 
majority of Congress votes expressly to authorize its continuance, or (b) at 
any other time that Congress legislatively vetoes the initiative.28 
Admittedly, however, the Supreme Court's decision last Term in INS v. 
Chadha29 cast serious doubt on the constitutionality of all legislative vetoes, 
including the one created by section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution: 
27. In the first passage (p.171), Keynes implies that a case involving the war powers might 
arise outside the context of the Resolution. That is unlikely given its structure: the President must 
report to Congress his use of force within 48 hours of its initiation, and he must then (a) end the 
usc within 60 to 90 days unless Congress expressly authorizes its continuance, or (b) limit or end it 
whenever so directed by majority votes in the House and Senate. But sec supra note 26. 
Keynes's fear that courts might find "some procedural rationale" for refusing to hear the 
case (p. 173) seems unwarranted. If asked, courts will probably construe the constitutionality of 
the War Powers Resolution and, assuming it has been found constitutional, then decide whether 
there has or.has not been compliance with its pertinent provisions. Federal courts are not prone to 
avoid cases brought squarely under federal statutes. They have also become somewhat more 
willing in recent years to consider cases involving the basic prerogatives of the President and 
Congress. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974); see also W. Rcvclcy, 
supra note 2, at 209-12, 216-17, 242, 262. 
28. But see supra note 26; infra text accompanying notes 29-30. 
29. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). 
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[A]t any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in 
hostilities outside the territory of the United States ... without a 
declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces 
shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by 
concurrent resolution. 30 
2127 
It follows that section 5(c) probably would not survive a dose of Chadha's 
rationale. 
On the other hand, it is interesting to speculate what the Court might 
have done had the constitutionality of a legislative veto first been questioned 
in the context of the War Powers Resolution. Viscerally, the Chadha facts 
were especially compelling-a twelfth-hour, drumhead vote by one house of 
Congress to expel a benign alien from this country, despite the executive 
branch's protestations that he deserved to stay.31 These facts invited the 
discovery of constitutional flaws in the expulsion procedure. Quite to the 
contrary, a likely set of war-power facts would place Congress, not the 
President, in the more sympathetic light; a typical war-power context would 
involve a considered vote by both houses of Congress to limit or stop use of 
American armed force abroad, one begun by the President acting solely on his 
own authority. 
Moreover, Justices White, Powell and Rehnquist took varied but serious 
exception to the Chadha majority's reasoning. The arguments of these three 
Justices-plus the absence in Chadha of any explicit indication that the major-
ity meant to overturn section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution-could 
provide the basis for the Court some years hence to sustain a legislative veto in 
the war-power context. 32 
In any event, Congress will very likely keep section 5(c) on the books to 
use if the need arises. At worst, the result will be a quick judicial ruling that 
Chadha did kill section 5(c). But even if the Court so ruled, it would remain 
likely as a practical matter that majorities in both houses who are willing to try 
to end an executive military action by using section 5(c) will also be willing to 
curb the executive branch by other means as well, for example, by condition-
30. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (Supp. V 1981). 
31. See Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2770-72. But it should be noted that the Court has summarily 
affirmed cases striking down legislative vetoes in less viscerally troublesome cases. See supra note 
26. 
32. "Perhaps I am wrong," wrote Justice White, "and the Court remains open to consider 
whether certain forms of the legislative veto are reconcilable with the Article I requirements." 
Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2796 n.ll (White, J., dissenting). The two most significant figures in the 
passage of the War Powers Resolution, former Senator Javits and Congressman Zablocki, feel 
that the act has not been severely harmed by Chadha, if at all. See 129 Cong. Rec. S10680 (daily 
ed. July 22, 1983) (article by Sen. Javits); id. at E3166 (daily ed. June 23, 1983) (remarks of Rep. 
Zablocki). 
On the other hand, Congress's claim to set American policy on aliens is exceptionally strong. 
See Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2804-06 (White, J., dissenting). Congress, with executive aquiescence, 
has historically exercised far more control over aliens than over the use of our military abroad. It 
may follow that, if a legislative veto is unconstitutional in so clear an area of congressional 
prerogative as the treatment of aliens, then such a veto would be even more suspect in the more 
ambiguous area of congressional prerogative over U.S. military intervention abroad. 
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ing or denying military appropriations, 33 selective service acts and the like, or 
even by threatening to impeach the Chief Executive. As a glue for holding 
such majorities together and as a spur for them to restrain the President by 
cutting appropriations, it would be hard to find anything more effective than 
a presidential refusal to honor a concurrent resolution passed under section 
5(c). His disregard of the sentiment so expressed by both houses, and the 
implicit challenge to congressional authority, would very likely have a galva-
nizing effect. 
Further, even though section 5(c) may not survive Chadha, the rest of the 
War Powers Resolution almost surely does since section 9 of the Resolution 
expressly provides for severability. 34 The remaining elements of the Resolution 
include section 3's presidential consultation obligations, section 4's presiden-
tial reporting duties, and section 5(b)'s provision for ending any executive use 
of force within sixty to ninety days unless approved by Congress prior to the 
deadline. Provisions expediting congressional consideration of war-power is-
sues also remain largely unaffected. These sections constitute by themselves-
wholly without the legislative veto-an assertion of congressional control over 
American war and peace unprecedented since the framing and ratifying of the 
Constitution; they provide a powerful vehicle for congressional involvement 
in shaping American policy. In sum, the War Powers Resolution remains alive 
and well after Chadha. 
Just as before Chadha, however, the extent to which the Resolution 
actually results in heightened congressional involvement in American deci-
sions to use force abroad will depend largely on congressional willingness to 
use the Resolution's procedures and then encourage the President-quite 
vigorously at times-to do so as well. Having enacted the Resolution over 
President Nixon's veto and despite his insistence that it was unconstitutional 
in part, Congress has since done little to persuade Presidents to do more than 
meet the act's minimal reporting requirements. Its consultation requirements 
in particular have gone unobserved, and Congress lost a singular opportunity 
in April 1975 to give the Resolution substance when the legislators, despite 
President Ford's invitation, failed to participate in shaping the Saigon evacua-
tion.35 
Nonetheless, Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan have all reported to 
Congress under the Resolution. It has been on the books for ten years and has 
gained the stature that age provides. Sometimes, as here, particular relations 
between Congress and the President can be altered by legislative fiat, respon-
sive to beliefs about what the Constitution requires. These relations can then 
shape the future play of politics. Through war-power legislation the President 
33. Congress forced an end to American involvement in the Indochina War in this fashion. 
See W. Reveley, supra note 2, at 122, 226. 
34. 50 U.S.C. § 1548 (1976). The statute in Chadha was also found severable. 103 S. Ct. at 
2774-76. But see the severability views of Justices White and Rehnquist, 103 S. Ct. at 2798 n.16 
(White, J., dissenting), 2816-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
35. See W. Reveley, supra note 2, at 250-53, 261-62. 
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has been encouraged to inform Congress in detail of his initiatives for war or 
peace. The legislators have been similarly encouraged to state their views 
because the act provides them with unavoidable occasions for so doing. And 
both branches may well be driven to build broader collaborative bridges to 
one another by the executive's need to report and Congress's need to assume 
responsibility. 
On September 29, 1983, for the fir.st time since the War Powers Resolu-
tion became law, Congress actually invoked it, authorizing the continuation 
of the President's use of armed force in Lebanon, but imposing an eighteen-
month deadline on the action. 36 Though questioning the authority of Congress 
to limit the commander in chief, President Reagan signed the legislation. 37 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
Keynes's Undeclared War has contributed to this country's continuing 
search for a satisfactory theory of the war powers. Its contribution is greatest 
in Keynes's review of the role of the courts in developing these powers. The 
book's contribution could have been greater, however, had it considered more 
thoroughly the nonjudicial aspects of that development. These aspects domi-
nate and, among them, the War Powers Resolution of 1973 is now particularly 
telling. 
36. I29 Cong. Rec. 7724-27 (daily ed. Sept. 29, I983). See generally N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 
I983, at AI, col. 6. 
37. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, I983, at AI, col. 1. 
